Abstract-The system that uses network coding is highly susceptible to pollution attacks, where a malicious node may pollute a small number of packets with the purpose of preventing the recipient nodes from reconstructing the original messages properly. Some schemes that use Message Authentication Code (MAC) have been proposed for resisting this attack. However, these schemes could be broken with probability 1/q, where q is the size of the underlying field. Although the trace function has already been used for constructing MACs for a higher security, it can only be used for single-generation distribution. This paper proposes a novel MAC-based scheme that also employs trace function. However, different from prior work, our scheme can be immediately used for secure multi-generation distribution. [2] has been applied to network for achieving the optimal throughput. However, it is susceptible to pollution attacks, where a malicious node injects corrupted packets into network, aiming at preventing the recipient from reconstructing the original file. Due to the way the packets are combined and transmitted, a small number of polluted packets can cause large-scale pollution propagation. To solve the problem, several public-key based schemes [5]-[8] and hybrid [14] [15] schemes are proposed. In these schemes, the source node signs the packet using a private key. The recipients use the public key known to all the nodes to check the integrity of the packet. However, these schemes are based on expensive paring operations [5]- [7] or exponentiation operations over a large field [8] , which makes these schemes not fast enough for online communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network coding [1] [2] has been applied to network for achieving the optimal throughput. However, it is susceptible to pollution attacks, where a malicious node injects corrupted packets into network, aiming at preventing the recipient from reconstructing the original file. Due to the way the packets are combined and transmitted, a small number of polluted packets can cause large-scale pollution propagation. To solve the problem, several public-key based schemes [5] - [8] and hybrid [14] [15] schemes are proposed. In these schemes, the source node signs the packet using a private key. The recipients use the public key known to all the nodes to check the integrity of the packet. However, these schemes are based on expensive paring operations [5] - [7] or exponentiation operations over a large field [8] , which makes these schemes not fast enough for online communication.
To address the inefficiency of public-key based scheme, some efficient symmetric-key based [9] - [13] schemes are introduced. Le et al. [13] proposed an efficient message authentication code (MAC) based inter-session scheme which supports multi-generation communication. However, its security relies on the size of the underlying field, which means in standard network coding based environment, where the field size is usually 8 2 , the scheme is not security enough. Cheng et al. [12] proposed a homomorphic MAC scheme which can achieve a higher security level using the same field size. However, it does not support multi-generation transmission and is susceptible to repetitive attacks [14] . A repetitive attack is when transmissions contains multiple generations [3] , a malicious node collect the legitimate packets from previous generations and use them to forge packets for current or subsequence generations.
In this paper, we propose a novel homomorphic MAC based scheme named MtMac. Our scheme has the following advantages:
(1) Unlike the scheme described in [10] [12], our scheme supports multi-generation transmission.
(2) Our scheme can prevent the repetitive attack while [10] [12] cannot.
(3) Our scheme can achieve the same level of security using smaller field size.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we'll introduce some definitions and notations which will be used in the construction of MtMac.
A. System Model
We propose a model of network based on linear network coding [2] . There are three kinds of nodes in the network: source node, intermediate node and recipient. The source node intends to send a file (i.e. some packets) to the recipient through the intermediate nodes. To achieve this, the source node divides the packets into g generations [3] . Each generation consist of m packets with n symbols. Then the source transforms m packets into a sequence of vectors 1 
an n-dimensional vector space over a finite field F q , where q is a prime. Then the source augments these m vectors to produce m augmented packets 1 2 , , ,
v , defined as: 1 2 , , ,
v by using Gaussian elimination on a ( ) × + m m n matrix which is formed by the m received linearly independent packets.
B. Threat Model
In our scheme, we assume that the source node and the recipients are trusted. Other than that, all the other nodes could be malicious. Malicious nodes may create polluted packets and inject it into a network, or distort the packet passing by. For instance, a malicious node may tamper with the tag carried by the packet, or collect legitimate packet from the previous generation to fake the packets for subsequent generation. We assume that the adversaries know the construction of our scheme and have the computation power to perform probabilistic polynomial time algorithms. We define a polluted packet as follows:
Definition 1: We denote V as a linear span of m vectors 1 2 , , ,
v of the gth generation. We say a packet 
C. Trace Functions and Finite Fields
In this section, we introduce some notations about the trace functions over finite field which will be used in our construction to replace the normal inner product operation.
In network coding, every source augmented packet 1 2 , , ,
, which is a finite extension of F q . So any element v in the linear span of 1 2 , , , … m v v v can be represented as:
where ∈ F , and every element in the linear span of 1 2 , , , … m v v v can be represented as:
where
This form of representation will be used in the sign and verification process of our scheme.
Definition 2: We suppose K is a finite extension of field E, and the dimension of K over E is n, the size of E is q.
Tr u is defined as follows: [17] K is a finite extension of E. Then the two basis 1 { , , } α α 
where the inner product arithmetic operates over F l q .
III. A HOMOMORPHIC MAC SCHEME (MTMAC)
In this section, we present the construction of MtMac. Let vector space V denotes the linear span of 1 2 , , ,
Each vector space has a unique identifier id, which is an element randomly sampled from a set I [6] . The source chooses a secret key k at random from the key space K and shares it securely with all the recipients. Then the source uses the secret key with a PRF to generate the key used in the MAC stage to compute a MAC tag i t for every basis i v . Then the source transmits the packet ( , , t )
id v into the network. When intermediate nodes received the packets from their parents, they employ the homomorphic property to create valid tags. Recipients use the tag and the secret key k to verify the packet and drop polluted packets. We let + = m n ls, where > s m and 1 > l .We denote I as the set of vector space identifiers, K as the key space and define our scheme as follows: and its tag t.
Output: 1 (accept) or 0 (reject).
Correctness:
The scheme must satisfy the following requirements: 
Security:
The security of a homomorphic MAC cryptographic scheme is defined using following game:
Definition 5: Let = T (Generate, Sign, Combine, Verify) be a homomorphic MAC cryptographic scheme. We denote the adversary by A and challenger by C . We say that T is secure if the probability that the PPT adversary A wins the following game is negligible:
Attack Game: Setup: C chooses a secret key k randomly from K . Queries: A adaptively queries C . Each query is of the form ( , ) 
Construction of MtMac: Let F be a pseudo random function (PRF):
The multiplications are operated on = F Output: If ′ = t t , output 1 (accept). Otherwise output 0 (reject).
Correctness: Recall from the correctness requirement that:
The tag t' computed by the verification algorithm is
The above equation comes from property (1) and (2) happens, the probability that Equation (9) , and all solutions to the above system is in
, so for a fixed * y , its valid tag could be any element in the solution space of the first m equations with the same probability. Hence, when 2 E happens, the probability that A has chosen a correct * t is at most 
Combine Equation (6), (7) and (10), we completed the proof.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section studies the performance of our MtMac cryptographic scheme in terms of bandwidth and computation overhead.
A. Bandwidth Overhead
We ignore the bandwidth consumed by the Generate stage, since it can be done offline. The online bandwidth overhead per packet includes 1 vector space identifier and 1 tag. Since our tags are elements of F 
B. Computational Overhead
For the same reason as the last subsection, we will only consider the online computation overhead for the next stages. The basis computation can be done off-line, so the source and the recipient can do the computation in advance.
Sign: Recall from Lemma 1, for each packet, the source node need to compute s multiplications over 
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a novel homomorphic MAC cryptographic scheme that used network coding. Since the probability that the scheme is broken is 1 / l q (q is the size of the underlying field, 1 > q ), we can use small fields to achieve the same level of security. Meanwhile, our scheme can be used in multi-generation content distribution network. Moreover, our scheme can prevent repetitive attacks and can be proven secure on the low-level cryptographic assumptions without random oracles. Thus, our scheme is desirable for the network coding based communication system or content distribution system. We are working on extend the approach proposed in this paper to multi-source network coding, spacetime code [20] - [23] , convolutional code [19] and standard network coding [18] .
